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THE “SOVEREIGNS OF CYBERSPACE” AND 
STATE ACTION: THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S 




Many scholars have commented that the state action doctrine forecloses use of the 
First Amendment to constrain the policies and practices of online service providers. But 
few have comprehensively studied this issue, and the seminal article exploring 
“[c]yberspace and the [s]tate [a]ction [d]ebate” is fifteen years old, published before the 
U.S. Supreme Court reformulated the federal approach to state action. It is important to 
give the state action doctrine regular scholarly attention, not least because it is increasingly 
clear that “the private sector has a shared responsibility to help safeguard free expression.” 
It is critical to understand whether the First Amendment has a role to play in the private 
sector, as Internet companies continue to develop and enforce their own content rules—as 
“lawyers at Facebook and Google and Microsoft” exercise “more power over the future of 
. . . free expression than any king or president or Supreme Court justice.” They are the 
“sovereigns of cyberspace.” This Article analyzes the state action doctrine as it exists 
today, examining: (1) how it distinguishes the public and private spheres, and (2) whether 
it forecloses the First Amendment’s application to nongovernmental Internet companies, 
specifically third–party platforms like Facebook and Twitter. The Article concludes that 
the state action doctrine does foreclose such an application. And with that in mind, the 
author suggests a state action theory suitable for the digital world. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
We cannot think about [the state action problem] too much; we 
ought to talk about it until we settle on a view both conceptually 
and functionally right.1 
—Professor Charles L. Black, Jr.  
The Internet exists in an architecture of privately owned websites, 
servers, routers, and backbones.2 Though this architecture enables Internet 
users to speak online,3 it has also enabled companies like Google and 
Facebook to conduct “private worldwide speech ‘regulation’”4 as they 
create and enforce their own rules regarding what types of user content are 
 
 1. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1966 Term—Foreword: “State 
Action,” Equal Protection, and California’s Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 70 
(1967).  
 2. David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study 
of Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 373, 377 (2010).  
 3.  Id.  
 4. Susan Benesch & Rebecca MacKinnon, The Innocence of YouTube, FOREIGN 
POL’Y (Oct. 5, 2012), http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/10/05/the-innocence-of-youtube/.  
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permissible on their platforms.5 Essentially, the companies are developing 
a de facto free speech jurisprudence, and in doing so they appear to be free 
to devise their content rules unconstrained by constitutional limits, 
including those imposed by the First Amendment.6 The basic reason: the 
companies are nongovernmental entities.  
Scholars have noted that online intermediaries appear to operate outside 
of constitutional strictures. Professor David Ardia says that “[w]hat many 
consider the largest public space in human history is not public at all.”7 
Professor Jeffrey Rosen says it is challenging to protect “values like privacy 
and free speech in the age of Google and Facebook, which are not formally 
constrained by the Constitution.”8 Professor Jack Balkin says that as “our 
economic and social lives are increasingly dominated by information 
technology and information flows, the First Amendment seems increasingly 
irrelevant to the key free speech battles of the future.”9 Underlying these 
comments is the state action doctrine, which dictates that the federal 
government lacks the “power to regulate the policies and practices of private 
entities under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”10 Recall that the 
First Amendment begins: “Congress shall make no law . . . .”11 And the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which has been read to apply the First Amendment 
to the states, includes the command: “No state shall . . . .”12 A threshold 
question in all First Amendment cases, therefore, is whether an alleged 
violation was committed by a government actor.13  
 
 5. See Somini Sengupta, On Web, a Fine Line on Free Speech Across the Globe, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/17/technology/on-the-
web-a-fine-line-on-free-speech-across-globe.html.  
 6. See id.  
 7. Ardia, supra note 2, at 377. ?  
 8. Jeffrey Rosen, The Deciders: Facebook, Google, and the Future of Privacy and 
Free Speech, in CONSTITUTION 3.0: FREEDOM AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 81 (Jeffrey 
Rosen & Benjamin Wittes eds., 2011).  
 9. Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 
427, 427 (2009).  
 10. Developments in the Law: State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, 123 
HARV. L. REV. 1248, 1250 (2010) [hereinafter State Action and the Public/Private 
Distinction].  
 11. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added); see also EUGENE VOLOKH, THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES: PROBLEMS, CASES AND POLICY ARGUMENTS 
1 (4th ed. 2011).  
 12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (emphasis added); see also VOLOKH, supra note 11, at 
1. ?  
 13. VOLOKH, supra note 11, at 1. ?  
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Courts so far have held that private online service providers are not state 
actors for First Amendment purposes.14 However, few scholars have 
directly addressed the problem of the state action doctrine and its 
application to such providers, and those scholars mostly have done so in 
special contexts like virtual worlds or government–operated webpages, or 
in a discussion of a larger topic like the power that intermediaries exercise 
over speech.15 Moreover, the seminal article exploring “[c]yberspace and 
the [s]tate [a]ction [d]ebate” is fifteen years old, published before the U.S. 
Supreme Court handed down a decision reformulating the federal approach 
to state action.16 Now is the time to give the doctrine more scholarly 
attention—as Professor Charles Black said, to “talk about it until we settle 
on a view both conceptually and functionally right”17—because Internet 
policy discussions worldwide are converging on the idea that “the private 
 
 14. See, e.g., Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Sols., Inc., 202 F.3d 573 (2d Cir. 2000); 
Island Online, Inc. v. Network Sols., Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 289 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); Nat’l A-
I Advert., Inc. v. Network Sols., Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D.N.H. 2000); CompuServe, 
Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997); Am. Online, Inc. v. 
Cyber Promotions, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
 15. See, e.g., Ardia, supra note 2; Rosen, supra note 8; Balkin, supra note 9; see also 
Eric Goldman, Speech Showdowns at the Virtual Corral, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 845, 851–53 (2005) (considering the tension between free speech rights 
and private property rights in the context of virtual worlds, and arguing that virtual worlds, 
like other online providers, do not merit special rules); James Grimmelmann, The Internet 
is a Semicommons, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2799, 2816–18 (2010) (arguing that the Internet 
is a semicommons and that the interplay between its private and common characteristics 
explains some of the enduring tensions in Internet law, including those under the state 
action doctrine); Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without Responsibility: Intermediaries and the 
First Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 986, 988 (2008) (showing that intermediaries 
have power over speakers but no responsibility to the speakers in using that power, and 
that “the First Amendment does not currently require a particular solution”); Christopher 
S. Yoo, Free Speech and the Myth of the Internet as an Unintermediated Experience, 78 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 697, 700 (2010) (discussing the fact that “[d]espite the best efforts 
of some advocates to expand the scope of the First Amendment, it remains a limit on 
governmental action that does not reach private action,” even those of Internet 
intermediaries); David S. Ardia, Government Speech and Online Forums: First 
Amendment Limitations on Moderating Public Discourse on Government Websites, 2010 
BYU L. REV. 1981, 1985–2010 (2010) (discussing why the First Amendment’s public 
forum doctrine is ill–suited to address the problems created when the government engages 
in expressive activities online).  
 16. See generally Paul Schiff Berman, Cyberspace and the State Action Debate: The  
Cultural Value of Applying Constitutional Norms to “Private” Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 1263, 1263 (2000).  
 17. Black, supra note 1, at 70. 
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sector has a shared responsibility to help safeguard free expression.”18 In 
the United States, it is critical to study and understand whether the First 
Amendment has any role to play in the private sector as “lawyers at 
Facebook and Google and Microsoft” exercise “more power over the future 
of . . . free expression than any king or president or Supreme Court 
justice.”19 They are the “sovereigns of cyberspace.”20 Against that 
background, this Article offers a singular examination of the First 
Amendment’s application to nongovernmental Internet companies, 
specifically third–party platforms like Facebook and Twitter. This Article 
explores the state action doctrine, focusing on: (1) how it distinguishes the 
public and private spheres, and (2) whether it forecloses the First 
Amendment’s application to nongovernmental third–party platforms.  
This Article begins with a general analysis of the doctrine and its 
traditions and values, as well as its historical distinction between public and 
private spheres.21 Then, the Article explores the law of public forums in 
order to analyze the similarity between third–party platforms and public 
forums.22 And, finally, the Article concludes that the state action doctrine, 
under its latest reformulation by the Supreme Court, does foreclose the First 
Amendment’s application to private Internet companies like Facebook and 
Twitter.23 With that in mind, the author suggests a state action theory 
suitable for the digital world that would enable judges to balance the rights 
of property owners with those of property users and be able to characterize 
a space as public for state action purposes even if it did not qualify as a 
traditional public forum.24  
II. STATE ACTION DOCTRINE: GENERAL ISSUES 
The state action doctrine, first articulated in 1883 in the Civil Rights 
Cases, is one of the “most complex and discordant doctrines in American 
 
 18. Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks on Internet Freedom at the 
Newseum, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 21, 2010), https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/
20092013clinton/rm/2010/01/135519.htm.  
 19. Terry Gross & Jeffrey Rosen, Interpreting the Constitution in the Digital Era, 
NPR (Nov. 30, 2011, 12:13 PM), http://www.npr.org/2011/11/30/142714568/interpreting 
-the-constitution-in-the-digital-era.  
 20. REBECCA MACKINNON, CONSENT OF THE NETWORKED: THE WORLDWIDE 
STRUGGLE FOR INTERNET FREEDOM xiv (2012).  
 21. See infra Part II. ?  
 22. See infra Part II. Section E. ?  
 23. See infra Part III.  
 24. See infra Part III. Section C. ?  
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jurisprudence.”25 For years, it held that the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
Bill of Rights restricted only governmental action.26 However, as the 
doctrine evolved, it came to apply far more widely—even to actions of 
private individuals and entities. For example, in the 1946 case Marsh v. 
Alabama, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Alabama violated the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments by forbidding a Jehovah’s Witness from 
distributing religious materials in a privately–owned town.27  
The challenge of applying the doctrine today lies at the juncture 
explored in Marsh, where the private and public spheres meet. It is a 
challenge not only because the doctrine is “complex and discordant” but 
also because of increasing privatization that has significantly “altered the 
foundation upon which the traditional understanding of the public/private 
distinction has been built.”28 Such privatization has touched many areas of 
public life, from prisons29 to hospitals30 to schools31 to development 
agencies32 and beyond.  
There is a need, then, for a continuing discussion of the proper 
boundaries of the state action doctrine,33 which remains as important today 
as it was in the last century.34 The doctrine has emerged fitfully, and the 
public/private distinction has evolved over time.35 For those reasons, the 
doctrine and distinction have been targets of scholarly criticism.36 The 
 
 25. State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1250; see also 
Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 505 (1985) 
(describing the views of commentators that the state action doctrine is so incoherent that it 
“never could be rationally or consistently applied”).  
 26. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 18 (1883). 
 27. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
 28. See, e.g., State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1250–
51. 
 29. See Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437 
(2005). 
 30. See BENJAMIN R. BARBER, JIHAD VS. MCWORLD 239 (1995). 
 31. See Valerie Strauss, A Primer on the Damaging Movement to Privatize Public 
Schools, WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-
sheet/wp/2016/01/07/a-primer-on-the-damaging-movement-to-privatize-public-schools/.  
 32. See Swaney v. Tilford, 898 S.W.2d 462, 463 (Ark. 1995). ?  
 33. State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1251. 
 34. Id. at 1250. 
 35. See id. at 1311–12. 
 36. See, e.g., Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 577, 610–11 (1997) (describing various 
examples of the criticism). 
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doctrine has been described as “incoherent,”37 a “conceptual disaster 
area,”38 a “failure,”39 and a ruse to advance subjective policy goals.40 Some 
scholars have called for the doctrine’s abandonment “in favor of a balancing 
approach that focuses on constitutional values.”41  
But other scholars have defended the doctrine for its role in “preserving 
the primacy of the law of a written constitution,”42 and the Supreme Court 
continues to use the doctrine to analyze constitutional claims in a range of 
contexts, such as racial discrimination, creditors’ rights, defamation, and 
antitrust.43 Historically, the Justices have used one of two tests to apply the 
doctrine, finding the conduct of a private actor to be state action where: (1) 
“the private actor performs a public function”; or (2) the private actor 
“performs a private function that has a close ‘nexus’ to, or ‘entanglement’ 
with, the government.”44 Those tests represent a “threshold requirement” of 
government or quasi–government action for “judicial consideration of 
constitutional claims and congressional enforcement of constitutional 
rights.”45  
In the last thirty–five years, the Supreme Court has merged those tests 
within a single two–part framework,46 under Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,47 
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,48 and Georgia v. McCollum49: 
The first inquiry is “whether the claimed [constitutional] 
deprivation has resulted from the exercise of a right or privilege 
having its source in state authority.” . . . The second inquiry is 
whether the private party charged with the deprivation can be 
described as a state actor. In resolving that issue, the Court [has] 
found it useful to apply three principles: (1) “the extent to which 
the actor relies on governmental assistance and benefits”; (2) 
 
 37. Michael J. Phillips, The Inevitable Incoherence of Modern State Action Doctrine, 
28 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 683, 683 (1984). 
 38. Black, supra note 1, at 95. 
 39. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1149 (1978). 
 40. See, e.g., Robert J. Glennon, Jr. & John E. Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the 
Fourteenth Amendment “State Action” Requirement, 1976 SUP. CT. REV. 221, 230. 
 41. Reuben, supra note 36, at 610. 
 42. Id. (citing Richard S. Kay, The State Action Doctrine, the Public-Private 
Distinction, and the Independence of Constitutional Law, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 329, 337–
43 (1993)). 
 43. See id. at 610–11. ?  
 44. Id. at 611. ?  
 45. State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1255. ?  
 46. Reuben, supra note 36, at 611–12. 
 47. 457 U.S. 922 (1982) 
 48. 500 U.S. 614 (1991). 
 49. 505 U.S. 42 (1992). 
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“whether the actor is performing a traditional governmental 
function”; and (3) “whether the injury caused is aggravated in a 
unique way by the incidents of governmental authority.”50 
This so–called Lugar–Edmonson framework lends support to 
commentators who have argued that the chief concern of the state action 
doctrine is to balance public interests and private harms.51 The pressing 
issue is determining what facts can trigger the finding of state action, a 
finding that “generally occurs when the complained-of conduct touches the 
most fundamental of constitutional concerns.”52 
A. BACKGROUND  
To understand where the doctrine is today, it is important to understand 
from where it came. As noted above, the Supreme Court articulated the 
doctrine in 1883 in the Civil Rights Cases, invalidating the Civil Rights Act 
of 1875 and holding that Congress lacked the power to enact legislation 
regulating private racial discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment.53 
That law penalized the private owners of places of public accommodation 
who discriminated based on race. Justice Joseph P. Bradley, writing for the 
majority, distinguished private and public wrongs, noting that where a 
wrongful act is not “sanctioned in some way by the state, or . . . done under 
state authority, [the victim’s] rights remain in full force, and may 
presumably be vindicated by resort to the laws of the state for redress,” but 
not by resort to the Constitution.54 
Justice Bradley saw violations of the constitutional rights of one private 
actor by another as a “conceptual impossibility.”55 Theoretically, his 
distinction between private and public wrongs promoted the “individualist 
goal of self-realization . . . by protecting the sphere of private conduct from 
judicial inquiry,” as long as the private conduct did not violate state statutes 
or the common law.56 Thus, Justice Bradley found that Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not authorize Congress to regulate private 
conduct, writing, “[u]ntil some State law has been passed, or some state 
action . . . has been taken, adverse to the rights of citizens sought to be 
 
 50. Id. at 51 (citations omitted). 
 51. Reuben, supra note 36, at 612. 
 52. Id. 
 53. State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1256. 
 54. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883). 
 55. State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1257. 
 56. Id.  
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protected by the fourteenth amendment, no legislation of the United States 
under said amendment . . . can be called into activity . . . .”57  
In the seventy years following the Civil Rights Cases, the Supreme 
Court reworked the state action doctrine significantly.58 The reworking 
reflected the Court’s “concern with the failure of existing legal rules to 
address troubling instances of racial discrimination,” ultimately signaling a 
dramatic shift from “formalist reasoning toward functionalist and 
instrumentalist reasoning.”59 The doctrine’s leading critic in the mid–
twentieth century was Professor Charles Black, who believed the doctrine 
was “the most important problem in American law.”60 He focused on the 
law’s role in addressing systemic racism, and he argued that the law was 
failing to play its role because of the state action doctrine’s willful blindness 
to nongovernmental actions.61 
Black dedicated much of his attention to Reitman v. Mulkey, in which 
the Supreme Court considered a provision of California’s Constitution that 
prohibited the state from enacting laws limiting a private actor’s discretion 
in the use of his or her real property.62 Justice Byron White, writing for the 
majority, adopted a functionalist and instrumentalist approach, focusing on 
“the necessity for a court to assess the potential impact of official action in 
determining whether the State has significantly involved itself with 
invidious discriminations.”63 The lower court had analogized California’s 
constitutional prohibition on state enactment of antidiscrimination laws 
with a state statute authorizing racial discrimination, an analogy White 
accepted because he viewed the impact to be the same.64 
On this basis, the Court rejected the distinction between “state action 
and inaction” that was at the heart of the Civil Rights Cases and invalidated 
California’s provision because it encouraged or involved the state in 
authorizing private discrimination.65 Black defended Reitman because it 
rejected the state action doctrine’s early formalism but did not reject the 
doctrine altogether, a position Black shared.66 He wanted to harmonize the 
 
 57. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 13. 
 58. See State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1258. 
 59. Id. (citing Phillips, supra note 37, at 699–700, 734–35). 
 60. See Black, supra note 1, at 69. 
 61. See State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1259. 
 62. Id. at 1259–60.  
 63. See 387 U.S. 369, 380 (1967). 
 64. State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1260. 
 65. Id.  
 66. See Black, supra note 1, at 82 (discussing Black’s proposal for the rule in 
Reitman). 
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doctrine with the “demands of justice”67 and thought it was insensible for 
the doctrine to act as an impediment to the resolution of the great problems 
of the day.68 
B. MODERN INTERPRETATION  
Under the current conception of the state action doctrine, the line 
between the public and private spheres is blurry. Scholars calling for the 
doctrine’s abandonment have done so because they believe it is “an abuse 
of deduction that ignores competing rights and interests,” and scholars 
defending the doctrine have done so because they believe it protects 
“individual autonomy.”69 For its part, the Supreme Court, in the 2000 
landmark case United States v. Morrison,70 reaffirmed the doctrine as it was 
articulated in the Civil Rights Cases.71 
Morrison addressed a provision of the Violence Against Women Act 
that offered a federal remedy to victims of gender–motivated violence.72 
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice William Rehnquist said the 
Commerce Clause did not authorize such a provision and reviewed 
Congress’s powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.73 He 
acknowledged the “enduring vitality of the Civil Rights Cases” and adopted 
their description of Congress’s powers under Section 5.74 He said the 
provision at issue was “directed not at any State or state actor, but at 
individuals who have committed criminal acts motivated by gender bias.”75 
As one group of commentators put it: 
[D]espite abundant congressional findings regarding disparate 
treatment on the basis of gender by state officials, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist deemed the intended remedy “simply not ‘corrective in 
its character, adapted to counteract and redress the operation of 
such prohibited [s]tate laws or proceedings of [s]tate officers.’” 
Thus, the Court invalidated an attempt by Congress to remedy 
violations of equal protection—otherwise a permissible exercise 
 
 67. State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1260. 
 68. See id.  
 69. Id. at 1261. 
 70. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 71. Id. at 602; see also State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, 
at 1262 n.56 (“If there is a single person responsible for the current, confining idea of state 
action, it is Rehnquist.” (quoting David J. Barron, Privatizing the Constitution: State Action 
and Beyond, in THE REHNQUIST LEGACY 345, 346 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2006))). 
 72. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 601–02. 
 73. Id. at 598. 
 74. Id. at 624. 
 75. Id. at 626. 
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of its enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment, even 
under the Civil Rights Cases—because it targeted private 
individuals rather than the states and state officials responsible for 
the violations. Regardless of whether the provision furthered the 
ends envisioned in the Fourteenth Amendment, it failed to satisfy 
the formal requirement of state action.76 
For these and other reasons, Professor Mark Tushnet believes the state 
action doctrine is “distracting us from paying attention to what truly 
matters.”77 He and Professor Gary Peller have called for the doctrine’s 
abandonment, rejecting the public/private distinction’s logic because 
“[e]very exercise of ‘private’ rights in a liberal legal order depends on the 
potential exercise of state power to prevent other private actors from 
interfering with the rights holder,” and thus “no region of social life . . . can 
be marked off as ‘private’ and free from governmental regulation.”78 Taking 
that argument to its logical conclusion, Tushnet says the doctrine’s 
abandonment could “require the government to remedy de facto burdens on 
constitutional rights.”79 That would mean constitutional rights serve 
substantive interests that, “when threatened, may require action on the part 
of the government.”80  
Morrison is the latest word from the U.S. Supreme Court on the state 
action doctrine, once again making violations of constitutional rights by a 
private actor a “conceptual impossibility.” This Article does not go as far as 
abandoning the doctrine, as Professors Tushnet and Geller advocate, but 
instead would support its reformulation to enable judges, as explained 
below, to balance the rights of property owners with those of property users.  
C. FREE EXPRESSION AND PRIVATE SPACES 
In light of that background, it might seem strange to apply the First 
Amendment to privately owned spaces. Doing so creates a tension between 
property rights and expressive rights. So far, however, those rights have 
coexisted relatively peacefully because “spaces traditionally understood to 
be public have historically been publicly owned,”81 a reality that today is 
changing. New forums for public expression are developing apart from the 
 
 76. State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1262–63 
(citations omitted). 
 77. Id. at 1263. 
 78. Gary Peller & Mark Tushnet, State Action and a New Birth of Freedom, 92 GEO. 
L.J. 779, 789 (2004). 
 79. State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1264. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. at 1303. 
PETERS_JCI (DO NOT DELETE) 2/6/2018 12:30 PM 
1000 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32:989  
 
classic public square, and their connection to state actors is tenuous, if not 
nonexistent.82  
Platforms like YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter defy easy classification 
in this area.83 To the extent they offer free public access and a place to 
engage in expressive activities, they operate as a virtual public forum—but, 
of course, their ownership is private. Thus, they are not unlike private 
shopping malls, which historically have had “dual public and private 
characteristics.”84 A line of cases addressing the application of federal and 
state free expression protections to private shopping malls has produced 
varied results, showing that the “balance between the values of autonomy 
and free speech reflects different conceptions of what makes a mall 
‘public’”: the nature of its ownership or the nature of its use.85 
Marsh v. Alabama,86 decided in 1946, was the first case to address the 
application of free expression protections to privately owned spaces.87 The 
issue before the Supreme Court was whether Alabama could punish a 
person who distributed religious literature in a company–owned town 
against the town management’s wishes.88 The Justices held that the town, 
which was owned and operated by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation, could 
not freely restrict expressive activity there, because the company town was 
the functional equivalent of a public municipality.89 Justice Hugo Black, 
writing for the majority, noted that whether a private or public entity “owns 
or possesses the town[,] the public in either case has an identical interest in 
the functioning of the community in such manner that the channels of 
communication remain free.”90  
Twenty years later, the Supreme Court extended those principles to 
privately owned shopping malls.91 In 1968, in Amalgamated Food 
Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., the Court decided 
whether peaceful picketing of a business located in a private shopping 
center could be enjoined because it invaded the property rights of the 
 
 82. Id.  
 83. See id. (citing the modern shopping mall as an example). 
 84. See id.  
 85. Id. at 1303–04. 
 86. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
 87. Id. at 502. 
 88. Id.  
 89. Id. at 507. 
 90. Id.  
 91. See Amalgamated Food Emps. Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 
319–20 (1968). 
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shopping center’s owners.92 The Justices held that peaceful picketing “in a 
location open generally to the public” was protected by the First 
Amendment.93 The Court said the shopping center served “as the 
community business block.”94 
After that, the Court decided Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner in 1972.95 The issue 
was whether “the right of a privately owned shopping center to prohibit the 
distribution of handbills on its property when the handbilling [wa]s 
unrelated to the shopping center’s operations.”96 The Justices narrowed 
Logan Valley by ruling that the First Amendment did not protect expressive 
activity in a private shopping mall unless the activity was “directly related 
in its purpose to the use to which the shopping center property was being 
put.”97  
Finally, the Court reversed Logan Valley in the 1976 case Hudgens v. 
NLRB,98 holding that the First Amendment “guarantee of free expression 
has no part to play in a case” where the speech activities occur at a privately 
owned shopping center.99 The Court held that a shopping center was not the 
“functional equivalent” of a municipality because it did not possess all of 
the attributes of one.100 Justice Potter Stewart, writing for the majority, said 
a stronger showing of state action was necessary because the First 
Amendment is a check “on state action, not on action by the owner of 
private property used nondiscriminatorily for private purposes only.”101 
Lloyd Corp. and Logan Valley represent a significant narrowing of the state 
action doctrine.  
Notably, as the U.S. Supreme Court developed that line of cases, 
California state courts confronted similar issues,102 developing a body of 
law that departed in critical ways from the federal system’s formalistic 
approach to state action. California law is useful to consider here for that 
reason, as an alternative to the federal approach—and because many of the 
major technology companies discussed in this Article, such as Facebook 
and YouTube, are physically based in California and operate in the shadow 
 
 92. Id. at 309. 
 93. Id. at 313. 
 94. Id. at 319. 
 95. 407 U.S. 551 (1972). 
 96. Id. at 552. 
 97. Id. at 563 (quoting Amalgamated Food Emps. Union, 391 U.S. at 320 n.9). 
 98. 424 U.S. 507 (1976). 
 99. Id. at 507. 
 100. Id. at 520. 
 101. Id. at 519 
 102. State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1305. 
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of its laws (although, obviously, these companies are subject to the laws of 
all the places where they operate).  
Four years before Logan Valley, the California Supreme Court ruled that 
the First Amendment protected expressive activity in privately owned 
shopping malls based on their “public character.”103 Then, after the U.S. 
Supreme Court decided Logan Valley and Hudgens, “California was forced 
to rule that the First Amendment did not require mall owners to 
accommodate private speech.”104 That paved the way for Robins v. 
Pruneyard Shopping Center105 in 1979, in which the California Supreme 
Court addressed whether soliciting signatures at a private shopping center 
was protected by the state constitution.106 The justices answered in the 
affirmative, supporting more expansive state free speech rights than those 
offered by the First Amendment.107 
The California Supreme Court pointed to the difference in the 
commands of the state and federal constitutions.108 The California provision 
commanded that “[e]very person may freely speak, write and publish his or 
her sentiments on all subjects,” while the federal provision commanded that 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”109 Thus, 
the state action doctrine did not control Pruneyard’s outcome, and 
ultimately the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed Pruneyard in the face of a 
federal constitutional challenge.110 
The issue in the federal case was whether California’s constitutional 
provisions permitting people to exercise free speech rights at a privately 
owned shopping center violated either the owner’s property rights under the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments or the owner’s free speech rights under 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments.111 The justices held that Tanner did 
not limit a state’s authority to adopt “individual liberties more expansive 
than those conferred by the Federal Constitution” and that states “may adopt 
reasonable restrictions on private property so long as [they] do not amount 
to a taking without just compensation.”112 This is significant because it 
 
 103. See Schwartz-Torrance Inv. Corp. v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers’ Union, 
394 P.2d 921, 924 (Cal. 1964). 
 104. State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1305. 
 105. 592 P.2d 341 (Cal. 1979). 
 106. Id. at 342. 
 107. Id. at 347. 
 108. State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1305. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. (citing Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980)). 
 111. Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 88.  
 112. Id. at 81. 
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means a state does not necessarily violate property rights by protecting 
expressive activity on private property.113 
Later, the California Supreme Court, in the 2001 case Golden Gateway 
Center v. Golden Gateway Tenants Association,114 reaffirmed Pruneyard 
when it addressed whether California law requires state action as a threshold 
for free expression violations.115 The court said it is required but can be 
satisfied when private property is “freely and openly accessible to the 
public.”116 This means California’s state action doctrine focuses on a 
property’s public use rather than its ownership. Golden Gateway, in effect 
echoing Pruneyard, cited the differences between the state and federal 
constitutions to account for California’s divergence from federal law.117 
But, interestingly, the opinion emphasized that California’s doctrinal 
approach, in concentrating on the public nature of a property, was consistent 
with the conception of state action in federal constitutional history.118 
The California Supreme Court noted that the distinction between 
government and private conduct “has been a hallmark of American 
constitutional theory since the birth of our nation.”119 And the court 
remarked that this distinction serves two important purposes: 
First, this demarcation is necessary to preserve private autonomy. 
“[B]y exempting private action from the reach of the 
Constitution’s prohibitions, [the state action limitation] stops the 
Constitution short of preempting individual liberty—of denying 
to individuals the freedom to make certain choices. . . . Such 
freedom is basic under any conception of liberty, but it would be 
lost if individuals had to conform their conduct to the 
Constitution’s demands.”  
Second, a state action limitation safeguards the separation of 
powers embodied in every American constitution by recognizing 
the limited ability of courts “to accomplish goals which are 
essentially legislative and political.” “Without a state action 
limitation, the courts will possess the same authority as the 
legislature to limit individual freedoms, but will lack the degree 
of accountability which should accompany such power.” As a 
result, absent a state action requirement, “the ‘rule of law’ would 
 
 113. State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1306. 
 114. 29 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001). 
 115. See id. at 809–10. 
 116. Id. at 810. 
 117. See id. at 809. 
 118. See id. at 808. 
 119. Id. 
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approach in Sir Ivor Jennings’ caustic but realistic phrase, ‘rule by 
the judges alone.’”120 
Thus, state action retains its place in California’s constitutional scheme, 
but Pruneyard established—and Golden Gateway affirmed—that 
California’s doctrine differs from that of the federal system. It is worth 
noting that very few states have followed California’s lead to offer more 
speech protections than the First Amendment.121 Despite speech provisions 
similar to California’s, seventeen state supreme courts have held that a more 
traditional state–action theory, such as Morrison’s, is required to bring 
speech claims under their constitutions.122 New Jersey is the only state that 
(to some degree) has followed California.123 Balancing property and speech 
rights on a case–by–case basis, New Jersey has extended private–property 
speech protections to a variety of contexts, including private colleges and 
universities, residential communities, and hallways in residential 
buildings.124 
These cases indicate that “the doctrine is still being shaped at the state 
level as courts continue to face difficult factual applications of their theories 
of state action.”125 One such application, regardless of level, involves 
platforms like Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter. They all share some of the 
characteristics of traditional public spaces, but they all are privately owned, 
too. The implications of their public and private characteristics are explored 
in the next section of this Article.  
D. A MATTER OF VALUES 
At the heart of any democratic legal system is a matrix of principles and 
values concerned with such things as equality and due process that apply 
generally, without regard to specific legal facts. For example, in the U.S. 
legal system, it is a foundational aspiration to provide equal justice under 
law,126 secured chiefly through the Equal Protection Clause and the 
“neutrality and independence of the judiciary.”127 Similarly, underlying 
every legal rule or standard is a matrix of values concerned with discrete 
 
 120. Id. (citations omitted). 
 121. See State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1306. 
 122. Id. at 1306–07. 
 123. Id. at 1307. 
 124. See id.  
 125. Id.  
 126. Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem of 
Arbitration, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 279, 290 (2004). 
 127. Id. at 291. 
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matters like property rights or free expression interests that apply when 
specific facts implicate them.128 For example, subjecting a private actor to 
liability for a First Amendment violation creates tension between the values 
of autonomy and property rights and that of free expression. Put it in the 
context of this Article, there is tension between the autonomy and property 
rights of the third–party platforms (e.g. Twitter and Facebook) and the free 
expression rights of their users. Before addressing this tension, however, a 
more general discussion is necessary. 
Recall that California’s approach to the state action doctrine diverges 
from the federal system’s approach as well as the approach of most state 
courts that have addressed state action requirements.129 These divergent 
approaches reflect varying conceptions of what it means to protect 
expressive activities on private property and different ideas of what values 
the state action doctrine ought to protect.130 California’s theory may be 
“anomalous,” but it reflects the “larger national dialogue about free 
expression and state action in public spaces.”131 One way to understand the 
divergent approaches, as noted earlier, is to focus on sources of authority.132 
California relied on its own constitution to expand free speech protections 
beyond those of the First Amendment.133 
Sources of authority, however, do not fully account for the 
divergence.134 After all, the majority of state constitutions around the 
country contain speech and press provisions “virtually identical” to 
California’s, and yet the majority have rejected California’s approach.135 
For example, New York’s constitution is so similar that the California 
Supreme Court declared in Golden Gateway that New York’s constitutional 
 
 128. See Jordan Daci, Legal Principles, Legal Values and Legal Norms: Are They the 
Same or Different?, 2010 ACADEMICUS–INT’L SCI. J. 109, 110–11 (2010). 
 129. State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1308. 
 130. Id.  
 131. Id.  
 132. Id.  
 133. Id.  
 134. See also Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Private Property, Public Property: Shopping 
Centers and Expressive Freedom in the States, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1229, 1261 (1999) (“Little 
can be gained by contrasting the claimed nonspecificity of the First Amendment’s wording 
with the greater protection said to be found in state expressive freedom guarantees.”). 
 135. State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1308; see also 
Gregory C. Sisk, Uprooting the Pruneyard, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 1145, 1163–65 (2007) 
(highlighting the similarity of free speech clauses in the constitutions of California, New 
York, and Iowa). 
PETERS_JCI (DO NOT DELETE) 2/6/2018 12:30 PM 
1006 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32:989  
 
history was relevant to its own interpretation of California’s constitution.136 
Meanwhile, New York, by contrast, characterized California’s state action 
approach as “hardly persuasive authority.”137 
California’s approach also borrows from First Amendment law.138 As 
discussed above, the early California cases made use of the First 
Amendment, and a more recent California case, Fashion Valley Mall v. 
NLRB, decided in 2007, was framed as an application of Pruneyard,139 
which the California Supreme Court described as an extension of the early 
cases’ “First Amendment-based jurisprudence.”140 More broadly, the 
California Supreme Court has referred in its opinions to fundamental First 
Amendment concepts,141 likening the private mall in Fashion Valley, for 
example, to “sidewalks of the central business district which, have 
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public.”142 Such language 
echoes Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, in which the U.S. 
Supreme Court defined traditional public forums.143 All meaning: the 
California Supreme Court’s position does not appear to be that the state 
constitution recognizes new types of public spaces—rather, it appears to be 
that shopping malls are new public forums, as that concept is understood 
vis–à–vis the First Amendment.144 
Of course, this does not mean Pruneyard, Golden Gateway, and 
Fashion Valley are primarily or only First Amendment cases.145 It means 
simply that there is appreciable overlap between California and federal 
doctrine in this area, an overlap that illustrates the “problem of defining 
public space[s] in today’s world.”146 The U.S. Supreme Court focuses on 
ownership to distinguish private and public property,147 while the California 
Supreme Court focuses on how a space is used.148 These opposing 
conceptions of “public” are the result of conscious choices based partly on 
 
 136. See Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass’n, 29 P.3d 797, 804–
05 (Cal. 2001). 
 137. SHAD All. v. Smith Haven Mall, 488 N.E.2d 1211, 1214 n.5 (N.Y. 1985). 
 138. See Fashion Valley Mall, L.L.C. v. NLRB, 172 P.3d 742, 749 (Cal. 2007) (citing 
Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons, 12 P.3d 720 (Cal. 2000)). 
 139. Id. at 745. 
 140. State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1309. 
 141. Id.  
 142. Id. (citing Fashion Valley Mall, 172 P.3d at 745). 
 143. See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515–16 (1939). 
 144. State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1309–10. 
 145. Id. at 1310. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
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the values underlying them.149 The U.S. Supreme Court has chosen to 
emphasize the values of autonomy and property rights, and the California 
Supreme Court has chosen to emphasize the free speech rights of 
“individual speakers against powerful private actors.”150 But these values 
do conflict in numerous ways. 
On the one hand, California’s approach pits the expression rights of 
patrons and owners against one another in a way that the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s approach does not.151 First, requiring mall owners to allow 
expressive activities on their property could interfere with the owners’ 
marketing activities that are essential to the mall’s commercial purpose.152 
This might put the owners in the discomfiting position of serving as the 
“host for [their] own roasting.”153 Second, to the extent that mall owners are 
required to host speech they find disagreeable, California’s approach could 
compel the owners to promote beliefs, at least indirectly, that they do not 
share, creating a potential conflict with post–Pruneyard cases holding that 
states cannot require private actors to provide forums for expression that 
those actors find disagreeable.154 
On the other hand, it is not clear that the U.S. Supreme Court’s approach 
offers a better way to balance the competing values. One team of 
commentators put it this way: 
As shopping centers continue to adopt more characteristics of the 
town square, a theory that cannot protect rights in these locations 
is problematic in light of our nation’s history of protecting free 
discourse in the spaces where such speech actually occurs. The 
more accessible owners make their property, the more public it 
becomes; California’s approach is appealing because it recognizes 
that even private property can assume public characteristics. Even 
conceding the difficulty of balancing the rights of owners and 
speakers, the bright-line rule of government ownership can 
become a simplistic and “absurd basis for choosing between the 
two liberties,” because conditioning free speech protections on the 
 
 149. Id. at 1310–11. 
 150. Id. at 1311. 
 151. Id. at 1312. 
 152. Gregory C. Sisk, Returning to the Pruneyard: The Unconstitutionality of State-
Sanctioned Trespass in the Name of Speech, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 389, 396 (2009). 
 153. Id.  
 154. State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1312 
(referencing Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 
(1995)). 
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identity of the property owner provides an artificially clear line 
that can minimize the merits of competing rights claims.155 
Such arguments are meritorious and animate Part IV’s suggestions for a 
state–action theory suitable for the digital world, where so much speech on 
matters of public concern occurs in privately owned spaces like Facebook 
and YouTube. A state–action theory for private spaces can have serious 
implications for the ability to speak freely online, whether the source of 
authority is state or federal. In fact, the scope of a modern state–action 
theory can make the difference between speaking out and not. Thus, there 
is a need for a debate over its proper scope because “[a]s the public becomes 
more private, and the private becomes more public, the contours of the state 
action doctrine may come to define the contours of our most basic 
constitutional rights.”156 
E. PUBLIC FORUM LAW 
This Section explores public forum law to analyze the similarity, if any, 
between public forums—property historically associated with the exercise 
of expressive rights—and third–party platforms like Facebook and Twitter. 
The analysis in this Section is general in nature and provides the framework 
for evaluating the public character of private property that will be used in 
the next part to consider whether the state action doctrine, in its current 
form, forecloses the First Amendment’s application to third–party 
platforms.  
Pruneyard relied on the functional equivalence of a privately owned 
shopping center and a traditional public forum (i.e., the “downtown” or 
“central business district”).157 The opinion emphasized the center’s “open 
and unrestricted invitation to the public to congregate freely,” thereby 
exempting “an individual homeowner” from the ambit of California’s free 
expression provision, “because individual homes are not freely and openly 
accessible to the public.”158 As discussed above, this means that the 
application of California’s free expression provision on private property 
depends on “the public character of the property.”159 Golden Gateway 
affirmed this approach by holding that “the actions of a private property 
 
 155. Id. at 1313 (citations omitted). 
 156. Id. at 1250 (citations omitted). 
 157. See Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass’n, 29 P.3d 797, 809–
10 (Cal. 2001) (citing Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 346 (Cal. 1979)). 
 158. Id. at 809. 
 159. Id.  
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owner constitute state action for purposes of California’s free speech clause 
only if the property is freely and openly accessible to the public.”160 
It is worthwhile, then, to explore the law of public forums and to 
consider the similarity between third–party Internet platforms, such as 
Facebook and Twitter, and public forums, such as public sidewalks and 
parks. The goal is to understand the extent of their functional equivalence. 
This is also valuable because the California Supreme Court, which referred 
to the public character of private property as a necessary condition of state 
action, followed lower court decisions that used Pruneyard to compare 
various types of private property and public forums161:  
[O]ur Courts of Appeal have consistently held that privately 
owned medical centers and their parking lots are not functionally 
equivalent to a traditional public forum for purposes of 
California’s free speech clause because, among other things, they 
are not freely open to the public. Our lower courts have also 
suggested that an apartment complex does not resemble a 
traditional public forum because it “is a place where the public is 
generally excluded.”162 
Under Hague and its progeny, the right to express your views in public 
places is fundamental to a free society, and certain public property is so 
historically associated with the exercise of expressive rights that the 
property cannot be closed, not entirely, to constitutionally protected 
expression—to speeches, meetings, parades, protests, and the like.163 The 
basic reason is that the property may be owned by the government, but it is 
held “in trust” for the public.164 That means members of the public should 
have as much right to speak there as they would on their own property.165 
Likewise, when the government chooses to open forums to the public, it 
should not be permitted to skew public debate there by regulating 
viewpoints.166 But on most public property, the government should be 
permitted “to regulate speech [there] in order to make its use of the property 
more efficient” (after all, speech can distract people, interfere with traffic 
flow, and so on—thus, content–neutral time, place, and manner limitations 
 
 160. Id. at 810. 
 161. Id.  
 162. Id. (citations omitted). 
 163. See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 514 (1939). 
 164. Id.  
 165. VOLOKH, supra note 11, at 603. 
 166. Id.  
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are permissible).167 Their historical significance is what makes public 
forums special, as explained by Justice Owen Roberts in Hague: “Wherever 
the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in 
trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for 
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and 
discussing public questions.”168 
Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court has divided public property into five 
categories.169 The first is the traditional public forum, which includes 
“government property that has traditionally been available for public 
expression,” such as sidewalks and parks.170 The second is the designated 
public forum, which includes “‘government property that has [been] . . . 
intentionally opened up for [the] purpose’ of being a public forum.”171 The 
third is the limited public forum, which includes government property 
“limited to use by certain groups or dedicated solely to the discussion of 
certain subjects.”172 The fourth is the nonpublic forum, which includes all 
other government–owned property not used by the government for 
speaking.173 And, finally, the fifth is “[n]ot a forum at all,” which includes 
government property that the government uses to speak (e.g. through a 
government–owned television channel).174 
Importantly, expressive activities in traditional and designated public 
forums are subject to reasonable time, place, and manner regulations.175 To 
be constitutional, such regulations must be content neutral,176 narrowly 
tailored,177 serve a significant government interest,178 and leave open ample 
 
 167. Id.  
 168. 307 U.S. at 515.  
 169. VOLOKH, supra note 11, at 601. 
 170. Id.  
 171. Id. (citations omitted).  
 172. Id. Earlier cases called this category a designated public forum and said the test 
was the one used when the government acted as sovereign, except the government could 
limit such a forum to the purposes for which it was created. Id. In practice, however, that 
was effectively the same as applying the “reasonable-and-viewpoint-neutral test” (after all, 
speaker and subject–matter limitations were permitted). Id. More recent cases, such as 
Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 
662 (2010), and Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 461 (2009), have treated 
the limited public forum as a separate category. VOLOKH, supra note 11, at 601. 
 173. VOLOKH, supra note 11, at 602. 
 174. Id. at 603. 
 175. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
 176. See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295 (1984). 
 177. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
 178. See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 
U.S. 150, 175 (2002). 
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alternative forums or channels of communication for protected 
expression.179 Meanwhile, expressive activities in limited and nonpublic 
forums can be subject to restrictions that are both reasonable and viewpoint 
neutral.180 In some such forums, like military bases and prisons, which are 
nonpublic, the government enjoys even broader authority to restrict 
expressive activities.181 And in the fifth public–property category—“not a 
forum at all”—the government acts as the speaker and may decide what 
speech to allow, even based on viewpoint.182 
It is important to keep these concepts in mind when considering, in the 
next part of this Article, the propriety of the First Amendment’s application 
to third–party platforms like Facebook and Twitter. Whether such platforms 
are seen as the functional equivalent of a public forum is legally significant 
and instructive in evaluating the public character of privately owned 
property.183 
III. APPLYING THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THIRD–PARTY 
PLATFORMS 
As noted in Part I, the Internet’s architecture relies on intermediaries to 
transport, host, and index content,184 enabling Internet users to speak 
online—and giving the intermediaries tremendous power to shape the 
 
 179. See, e.g., Heffron v. Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981). 
 180. See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 
661, 679 (2010). 
 181. See generally Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989) (prisons); Brown v. 
Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (military bases). 
 182. See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 667, 676–78 
(1998). 
 183. It is useful to say a few words about 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability for private actors. 
A comprehensive discussion is beyond the scope of this Article, but the statute authorizes 
the filing of a civil action against a state actor for a deprivation of civil or constitutional 
rights. Jeremy Brown, Pan, Tilt, Zoom: Regulating the Use of Video Surveillance of Public 
Places, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 755, 780 n.166 (2008). Although the statute’s language 
does not include any immunities, the U.S. Supreme Court has granted immunity to 
government officials where there exists a “tradition of immunity . . . so firmly rooted in the 
common law and . . . supported by such strong policy reasons” that Congress would not 
have abolished that tradition upon enacting § 1983. See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 164 
(1992) (quoting Owen v. City of Indep., 445 U.S. 622, 637 (1980)). Immunity reflects the 
government’s interest in managing the risk of “distraction of officials from their 
governmental duties” and of “deterrence of able people from public service.” See Harlow 
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816 (1982). This is relevant because it is possible for private 
actors like YouTube and Facebook to be deemed state actors under § 1983.  
 184. See Ardia, supra note 2, at 377. ?  
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public discourse.185 Third–party platforms like Facebook and Twitter 
conduct “private worldwide speech ‘regulation’” as they draft and enforce 
their respective platforms’ content rules.186 “They decide what types of 
content may be posted, whether to remove certain content in response to 
user requests, whether to remove content that allegedly violates the law, and 
how to display and prioritize various content types using algorithms, all 
against the background of democratic values and business interests.”187 The 
platforms are developing what amounts to a de facto free speech 
jurisprudence, and the crux of this Article is an exploration of whether the 
state action doctrine permits, and ought to permit, the First Amendment’s 
application to such platforms. This Part employs the concepts explored in 
the foregoing Sections, and it includes both descriptive and normative 
perspectives. 
The focus of this analysis is limited to one type of Internet intermediary: 
third–party platforms.188 To compare Internet intermediaries and how they 
facilitate online speech, Professor David Ardia developed a trifurcated 
classification system for them, including: (1) communication conduits, 
which transport data across the network; (2) content hosts, which store, 
cache, or otherwise provide access to content; and (3) search and 
application providers, which index or filter content without necessarily 
hosting it.189 The second classification includes web–hosting services and 
third–party platforms190 that provide access to content by operating between 
primary publishers and audiences.191 More specifically, web–hosting 
services allow users to host their own webpages, and third–party 
platforms—like Facebook and Twitter—offer various services to users that 
enable them to share content and network socially.192 Content hosts are the 
focus of this Article because they have knowledge of, and control over, the 
 
 185. See id. Also playing a major role are common law principles of intermediary 
liability and Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. See, e.g., Aniket Kesari, 
Chris Hoofnagle & Damon McCoy, Deterring Cybercrime: Focus on Intermediaries, 32 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2017); Shahrzad T. Radbod, Craigslist—A Case for 
Criminal Liability for Online Service Providers?, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 597 (2010). 
They are worthy of discussion, but they are not the focus of this Article.  
 186. Benesch & MacKinnon, supra note 4. ?  
 187. See generally Jonathan Peters, All the News That’s Fit to Leak, in TRANSPARENCY 
2.0: DIGITAL DATA AND PRIVACY IN A WIRED WORLD 117, 117–29 (Charles N. Davis & 
David Cuillier eds., 2014).  
 188. See Ardia, supra note 2, at 386.  
 189. Id. at 386–87. ?  
 190. Id. at 387. ?  
 191. Id. at 388–89. ?  
 192. See id. at 389. ?  
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content of the speech they intermediate.193 Content hosts—and specifically 
third–party platforms—have billions of users and “are many speakers’ 
principal means of online communication.”194 Thus, content hosts truly 
stand to operate as arbiters of free expression online.195 As such, the rest of 
this Article considers whether the state action doctrine permits application 
of the First Amendment to third–party platforms.  
A. TO SAY WHAT THE LAW IS 
According to the rules laid out in Hudgens and Morrison, as well as 
those laid out in the Lugar–Edmonson framework, the communications 
activities on third–party platforms would not satisfy state action 
requirements for federal purposes.196 Morrison reaffirmed the narrow and 
 
 193. See id. ?  
 194. See Third-Party Platforms, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/free-
speech-weak-link#platforms (last visited Sept. 17, 2017). 
 195. By contrast, communication conduits have no direct knowledge of, and very 
limited ? control over, the content of the speech they facilitate. Ardia, supra note 2, at 387. 
And search and application providers have limited knowledge of, and limited control over, 
the content of the speech they intermediate, insofar as search engines and filtering software 
select search results based on neutral computer algorithms and thematic preferences that 
represent the companies’ judgments about what information to present and how to do so. 
Eugene Volokh, First Amendment Protection for Search Engine Search Results, VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (May 9, 2012, 2:37 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/05/09/first-
amendment-protection-for-search-engine-search-results/.  
 196. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 599 (2000); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 
U.S. 507, 519 (1976). It is possible, but not plausible, that a court would use the Lugar–
Edmonson framework to find state action. The chief concern would be the three principles 
that guide the analysis of the second step. To satisfy the first principle, the argument would 
be that content hosts rely on governmental assistance and benefits on the theory that, but 
for the government–financed research that led to ARPANET, there would be no Internet. 
This is likely not a winning argument because other than the ancestor connection, content 
hosts are independent from the government. In addition, from a policy point of view, it is 
not sensible to allow an actor’s mixed public–private origins to be sufficient to satisfy the 
principle that the actor relies on governmental assistance and benefits. Ardia, supra note 2, 
at 377. In the case of content hosts, it ignores the totality of the circumstances that today 
the Internet exists on a layered architecture of “privately owned Web sites, privately owned 
servers, privately owned routers, and privately owned backbones.” Id. Because of the 
federal approach’s formalism, ownership is key. Next, to satisfy the second principle, the 
argument would be that content hosts are performing a traditional governmental function 
on the theory that the government has played a role in the online environment by supporting 
its creation. However, third–party Internet platforms store, cache, or otherwise provide 
access to content, operating between primary publishers and their audiences. That is not a 
traditional government function in the offline or online world. Finally, to satisfy the third 
principle, the argument would be that the injury caused—the deprivation of free speech 
interests—is aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of governmental authority on the 
theory that, but for the government–financed research that led to ARPANET and later the 
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traditional approach articulated in the Civil Rights Cases, which treated the 
violation of the constitutional rights of one private actor by another as a 
“conceptual impossibility.”197 Hudgens, meanwhile, reversed a line of cases 
extending state action to private actors.198 Justice Potter Stewart, writing for 
the majority, said the First Amendment “has no part to play in a case” where 
the expressive activities occur at a privately owned shopping center.199 The 
Court said such a center is not “functionally similar” to a municipality 
because it does not possess all of the attributes of one.200 To argue that a 
shopping center is “dedicated to certain types of public use” because it is 
“open to the public” and “serves the same purposes as a ‘business district’ 
of a municipality” is to go too far.201 Under Hudgens, the “Constitution by 
no means requires such an attenuated doctrine of dedication of private 
property to public use.”202 
Hudgens also dismissed the applicability of the theoretically close 
Marsh decision, which involved a company town with “all of the attributes 
of a state-created municipality” that exercised “semi-official municipal 
functions as a delegate of the State.”203 The company town’s owner, in 
effect, was performing “the full spectrum of municipal powers and stood in 
the shoes of the State.”204 In the context of third–party platforms, “there is 
no comparable assumption or exercise of municipal functions or power.”205 
They perform a variety of functions to facilitate speech on blogging sites 
like Tumblr, social networks like Facebook, photo–hosting services like 
Flickr, and video–hosting services like YouTube.206 They play a crucial role 
in the distribution of speech and in facilitating a “speaker’s broad reach and 
 
Internet, there would have been no injury at all. However, the Internet was designed to be 
distributed and decentralized, which means platforms are not required to seek the approval 
of any central authority to host content. In that sense, the platforms have virtual free will, 
and thus the responsibility for their actions cannot extend to the government. All of that 
said, it is important to note that these results come from applications of the law as it exists, 
not how it ought to be. For a discussion of how the law ought to be, see infra Section III.B.  
 197. State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1257; see also 
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 599.  
 198. Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 507. ?  
 199. Id. at 521. ?  
 200. Id. at 519. ?  
 201. Id. at 519 (quoting Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 568–69 (1972)). ?  
 202. Id. ?  
 203. Id. ?  
 204. Id. ?  
 205. See id. ?  
 206. See Ardia, supra note 2, at 388. ?  
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a listener’s varied choices.”207 And, from a technological standpoint, they 
store, cache, or otherwise provide access to Internet content, operating 
between speakers and their audiences.208 But despite their significance, they 
certainly do not have all of the attributes of a municipality that the U.S. 
Supreme Court required under Marsh for state action, such as “residential 
buildings, streets, a system of sewers, a sewage disposal plant and a 
‘business block’ on which business places are situated.”209 For these 
reasons, under Hudgens and Morrison, as well as Marsh, the federal state 
action doctrine would foreclose the First Amendment’s application to third–
party platforms. 
The same result can be reached under the Lugar–Edmonson framework, 
lending support to commentators who have said the doctrine’s chief concern 
is to balance public interests and private harms.210 The framework requires 
a two–step inquiry: (1) to determine “whether the claimed constitutional 
deprivation has resulted from the exercise of a right or privilege having its 
source in state authority”;211 and (2) to determine “whether the private party 
charged with the deprivation can be described as a state actor.”212 Under the 
second step, three principles are relevant: (1) “the extent to which the actor 
relies on governmental assistance and benefits;” (2) “whether the actor is 
performing a traditional governmental function;” and (3) “whether the 
injury caused is aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of 
governmental authority.”213 
To apply that framework and those principles in the context of third–
party platforms, consider a February 2011 incident when Facebook 
removed a drawing posted by the New York Academy of Art to its 
Facebook page that depicted a topless woman.214 Imagine the Academy 
wanted to file a legal complaint. The creation and public exhibition of art is 
protected First Amendment activity, so the first step under the Lugar–
Edmonson framework would be satisfied: the “deprivation has resulted 
from the exercise of a right . . . having its source in state authority.”215 The 
second step, however, is a different story. In other words, Facebook could 
 
 207. Id. at 389. ?  
 208. Id. at 387. ?  
 209. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 502 (1946). ?  
 210. Reuben, supra note 36, at 612. ?  
 211. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620 (1991). ?  
 212. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 51 (1992). ?  
 213. Id. ?  
 214. See Adrian Chen, How to Get Boobs on Facebook, GAWKER (Feb. 19, 2011, 1:17 
PM), ? http://gawker.com/5765057/how-to-get-a-boob-on-facebook.  
 215. See McCollum, 505 U.S. at 51. ?  
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not be described as a state actor, because it does not satisfy the three 
principles under the framework’s second step. 
First, Facebook does not rely to any appreciable extent on 
“governmental assistance and benefits.”216 Although government–financed 
researchers planted the Internet’s seeds, and the company benefits today 
from certain government–created tax incentives, Facebook is otherwise 
independent from the government. The vast majority of the company’s 
revenue comes from advertising,217 and its other major sources of revenue 
have included private investments and its 2012 initial public offering.218 In 
addition, the company is managed by a group of executives and directors, 
all free from government assistance or interference, except for laws and 
regulations of general applicability (e.g. rules governing the sale of 
securities).219 
Second, Facebook is not “performing a traditional governmental 
function”220 by storing, caching, or providing access to content.221 The 
government traditionally has played no such role in the online environment. 
Here, the closest offline analogs are bookstores and libraries, which 
intermediate all manner of print publications, from books to pamphlets and 
magazines—and beyond.222 Public archives are a possible analog, too. The 
government traditionally has not owned or operated book or media stores, 
and even though public libraries receive government funding and are staffed 
by civil servants, in effect making their operation a governmental function, 
they are distinguishable from third–party platforms because such libraries 
are governed by a board that serve the public interest.223 The board’s 
mission is critical to the libraries’ functioning, and there is no equivalent for 
third–party platforms.224 Similarly, public archives are operated to serve the 
 
 216. See id. ?  
 217. Anita Balakrishnan, Facebook Ad Revenue Shoots Up 53%, Sending Shares 
Climbing, CNBC (Feb. 2, 2017, 11:16 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/01/facebook-
earnings-q4-2016.html. 
 218. Paul Vigna, What’s Facebook Really Worth? Try $13.80, WALL ST. J. (May 25, 
2012, 1:14 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2012/05/25/whats-facebook-really-
worth-try-13-80/.  
 219. See Owen Thomas, Here Are All the Top Executives Who Actually Run Facebook, 
BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 2, 2012, 3:10 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-senior-
management-team-2012-8.  
 220. McCollum, 505 U.S. at 51. ?  
 221. Ardia, supra note 2, at 387. ?  
 222. Id. at 388. ?  
 223. RICHARD E. RUBIN, FOUNDATIONS OF LIBRARY AND INFORMATION SCIENCE 299 
(2000).?  
 224. See id.  
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public interest, and many of the documents they house are required by law 
to be preserved and publicly accessible (e.g. under the Presidential Records 
Act). That is not true for the data hosted by third–party platforms. 
Third, “the injury caused”—the deprivation of free speech rights—“is 
[not] aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of governmental 
authority.”225 In fact, it is not aggravated at all by government. Facebook’s 
content–policy team is led by employees,226 and working under them are 
content moderators, mostly independent contractors, who review 
complaints about content that allegedly violates the platform’s rules.227 At 
the time of the incident involving the New York Academy of Art, those 
teams were responding to removal requests by applying rules set out in 
Facebook’s “Operations Manual for Live Content Moderators,” produced 
by a private consulting firm.228 After removing the drawing posted by the 
Academy, Facebook apologized and said the removal was its own 
mistake.229 In other words, any injury was caused by Facebook or its agents. 
For these reasons, under the Lugar–Edmonson framework, the state action 
doctrine would foreclose the First Amendment’s application to third–party 
platforms.  
Importantly, Facebook is not unique. This Article uses Facebook as an 
example because it is the largest third–party platform, but it would be 
possible to substitute any number of other platforms, such as Twitter, 
YouTube, or Flickr, in place of Facebook. Twitter, especially, has seen its 
share of recent content–related controversies—from the bullying of actress–
comedian Leslie Jones that prompted the microblogging site to ban Milo 
Yiannopoulos, to the use of Twitter to spread false and misleading claims 
during the 2016 presidential election.230 In any case, there are differences 
among the third–party platforms but, at a high level of abstraction, they all 
serve the same purposes. They store, cache, or otherwise provide access to 
 
 225. See McCollum, 505 U.S. at 51. ?  
 226. See Community Standards, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
communitystandards/ (last visited Dec. 22, 2017).  
 227. Jeffrey Rosen, The Delete Squad, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 28, 2013), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/113045/free-speech-internet-silicon-valley-making-rules.  
 228. See id. ?  
 229. Id. ?  
 230. See Mike Isaac, Twitter Bans Milo Yiannopoulos in Wake of Leslie Jones’s 
Reports of Abuse, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/20/
technology/twitter-bars-milo-yiannopoulos-in-crackdown-on-abusive-comments.html; 
Donie O’Sullivan, Fake News Rife on Twitter During Election Week, Study from Oxford 
Says, CNN MONEY (Sept. 28, 2017, 2:06 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/09/28/media/
twitter-fake-news-election-study/index.html. 
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Internet content,231 and they offer a variety of services to users that enable 
them to share content and network socially.232 There is no doubt they have 
radically democratized publishing. And, for now, there is no doubt that the 
state action doctrine does not permit the First Amendment’s application to 
such platforms. 
B. TO SAY WHAT THE LAW OUGHT TO BE 
As online communication continues to evolve,233 and as content hosts 
continue for many people to be the principal means of public 
communication,234 a state action theory that fails to protect free speech 
interests in such spaces is problematic—especially “in light of our nation’s 
history of protecting free discourse in the spaces where such speech actually 
occurs.”235 The private is becoming more public, and thus the state action 
doctrine may come to define the contours of our fundamental rights.236 That 
being said, a state action theory that fails to protect the values of autonomy 
and property rights is equally problematic. It would preempt individual 
liberty, insofar as it would deny property holders the “freedom to make 
certain choices,” such as how a platform wants to operate and the types of 
speech it wants to host.237 That freedom is fundamental to any conception 
of liberty and would be lost if platforms had to comply strictly with First 
Amendment requirements.238 With these concerns in mind, the goal of this 
section is to articulate a state action theory suitable for a digital world 
“where public title and public use overlap with less frequency.”239 
It is tempting to adopt California’s more liberal approach to state action 
because of its sensitivity to free expression interests. After all, the 
expressive uses of third–party platforms can be consequential. An 
anonymous blogger covering police corruption might use a hosting service 
like Blogger to share what she knows with the world.240 A group with 
unpopular views might assemble on a social networking site like Facebook 
 
 231. Ardia, supra note 2, at 387. ?  
 232. See ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., supra note 194. ?  
 233. See Rosen, supra note 8, at 260. ?  
 234. See ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., supra note 194. 
 235. State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1313 (citing 
? Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)). 
 236. Id. at 1250. 
 237. Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass’n, 29 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 
2001). 
 238. Id. ?  
 239. State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1312. ?  
 240. Ardia, supra note 2, at 388. 
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to debate those views.241 Citizen journalists might monitor government 
power by publishing photos and videos on hosting sites like Flickr and 
YouTube.242 Activists might organize protests using Twitter. 243 
Drawing on the ideas of Professor Thomas Emerson, such uses of third–
party platforms stand to facilitate self–fulfillment by allowing users to 
express themselves; to advance knowledge and discover truth by debating 
ideas and sharing content with one another; to achieve a more stable and 
adaptable community by being exposed to more ideas and developing 
greater tolerance; and to allow users to be involved in the democratic 
decision–making process by holding those in power accountable for their 
actions.244 Indeed, the accountability of elected officials “interrelates with 
participation, in that government accountability makes individual and 
public participation meaningful.”245 Thus, all of those uses of third–party 
platforms illuminate the value of free expression to the individual (i.e. the 
platform user) and the value of free expression to society as a whole (i.e. all 
citizens). 
A state action theory suitable for the digital world ought to respect the 
importance of free expression as a means to personal development and self– 
fulfillment—and the role of content hosts in providing access to such 
expression. Just as a liberal approach to state action threatens a platform’s 
autonomy and property rights, a traditional approach that fails to protect 
expression where it actually occurs246 can be an “affront to the dignity” of 
an individual user.247 After all, without the freedom to search for truth and 
discuss questions of right and wrong, individuals are placed, as Emerson 
writes, in the “arbitrary control of others.”248 
Further, a state action theory suitable for the digital world ought to 
respect the freedoms of thought, discussion, and investigation as goods in 
their own right, as well as the idea that society benefits from an open 
exchange of ideas.249 Whether or not the truth always prevails, it will never 
prevail in a legal system that fails to protect the online marketplace for 
 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6–7 (1970). ?  
 245. Reuben, supra note 126, at 288. ?  
 246. See State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1313 (citing 
Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).  
 247. EMERSON, supra note 244, at 6. ?  
 248. Id. ?  
 249. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (David Bromwich & George 
Kateb eds., 2003) (1859).  
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expression. This general idea has factored prominently in the case law of 
democracies worldwide, from the Handyside case in the European Court of 
Human Rights to the Abrams case in the U.S. Supreme Court.250 Moreover, 
it is not unreasonable to look at third–party platforms as staples in “the 
promotion of civil society,” the “space between purely governmental and 
purely private affairs,” where a great deal of “societal interaction” takes 
place.251 The interactions in that space encourage “cooperation, 
reciprocation, and a sense of common good among citizens at all levels of 
national life,”252 an encouragement that would be impossible but for free 
expression—the exercise of which occurs increasingly via third–party 
platforms. This is an important point because, as Professor Robert Putnam 
found, civil society is “just as important to the consolidation of a healthy 
democracy as properly functioning political institutions.”253 
A state action theory that is blind to the value of free expression to the 
individual, the value of free expression to society, the value of civil society 
to democracy, and the indispensability of third–party platforms to all of the 
above would surely “distract[] us from paying attention to what truly 
matters.”254 The federal state action theory is so blind in the context of 
third–party platforms. But so is the California theory, which supports more 
expansive free expression rights than those afforded by the First 
Amendment. Recall that its theory focuses on a private property’s public 
use rather than its ownership, and in evaluating a private property’s public 
character, Pruneyard relied on the property’s functional equivalence to 
traditional public forums.  
At a glance, it appears possible for third–party platforms to satisfy 
California’s requirements. In many ways, platforms have been replacing 
traditional public forums, the public streets and parks that “have 
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of 
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts 
between citizens, and discussing public questions.”255 The likes of 
Facebook and Twitter have not been held in trust for the public’s use, 
because they are privately owned, but they have been used—and dedicated 
 
 250. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919); Handyside v. United 
Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18–19 (1976).  
 251. Reuben, supra note 126, at 291–92. ?  
 252. Id. at 292. ?  
 253. Id. 
 254. See State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1263 
(quoting Professor Mark Tushnet).  
 255. Hague, 307 U.S. at 515. ?  
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to—various expressive purposes, and they have been “freely and openly 
accessible to the public.”256 Consider the leading platforms’ policy 
statements: Google says it “aim[s] to offer a platform for free expression” 
and that it has a “bias in favor of people’s right to free expression in 
everything [it does].”257 Former Twitter CEO Dick Costolo once said, “We 
think of Twitter as the global town hall” and the “free speech wing of the 
free speech party.”258 Facebook says it “give[s] people the power to share 
and make the world more open and connected” and to “see the world 
through the eyes of others.”259 And YouTube says it “provides a forum for 
people to connect, inform, and inspire others across the globe.”260 
The problem is that the U.S. Supreme Court has characterized 
traditional public forums as “physical property owned or controlled by the 
government,”261 so narrowly defining their boundaries that there is little, if 
any, room for the recognition of new traditional public forums, such as 
third–party platforms.262 That problem is exemplified by International 
Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee,263 in which the Court held that 
airports were not traditional public forums.264 In light of the “lateness with 
which the modern air terminal has made its appearance,” the Court wrote, 
“it hardly qualifies for the description of having ‘immemorially . . . time out 
of mind’ been held in the public trust and used for purposes of expressive 
activity.”265 Similarly, in Perry Education Association v. Perry Local 
Educators’ Association, the Court concluded that traditional public forums 
arise “by long tradition or by government fiat.”266 No Internet platform 
currently could be a product of long tradition, and even though theoretically 
this could one day be the case, the Supreme Court’s characterization of 
 
 256. Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass’n, 29 P.3d 797, 810 (Cal. 
2001). ?  
 257. Rachel Whetstone, Free Expression and Controversial Content on the Web, 
GOOGLE ? (Nov. 14, 2007), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2007/11/free-expression-and-
controversial.html.  
 258. Laura Sydell, On Its 7th Birthday, Is Twitter Still the ‘Free Speech Party’?, NPR 
(Mar. 21, 2013, 2:57 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2013/03/21/
174858681/on-its-7th-birthday-is-twitter-still-the-free-speech-party.  
 259. FACEBOOK, supra note 226. ?  
 260. Marc Aaron Melzer, Copyright Enforcement in the Cloud, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 403, 424 n.108 (2011). ?  
 261. Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1975, 1981 (2011). ?  
 262. See id. at 1982–83. ?  
 263. 505 U.S. 672 (1992). ?  
 264. Id. 680–81. ?  
 265. Id. at 680 (citations omitted). ?  
 266. 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). ?  
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public forums as “property owned or controlled by the government” would 
remain an impediment. 
Because of the nexus between traditional public forums and state action 
requirements, California’s approach would not be suitable for a digital 
world.267 Like the federal approach, it forecloses the First Amendment’s 
application to third–party platforms and thus fails to protect “free discourse 
in the spaces where [it] actually occurs.”268 In other words, although 
California’s state action theory is not blind to the value of free expression 
in privately owned spaces, it simply fails to make room for third–party 
platforms, which are indispensable to the public discourse in the present 
day. 
For these reasons, neither the federal nor California state action theory 
is adoptable in its entirety. The next Section articulates a hybrid theory 
suitable for a digital world—a theory that “reconciles the increasing 
privatization of public forums with the rights of property owners.”269 
C. A THEORY SUITABLE FOR A DIGITAL WORLD 
At this point in the Article, the state action doctrine has been 
disassembled and examined from a variety of angles, and it is time to 
reassemble the pieces and to devise a state action theory suitable for a digital 
world. Ironically, it requires a return to Marsh, decided in 1946 by the U.S. 
Supreme Court—fifty–eight years before Facebook was founded,270 fifty–
nine years before YouTube was founded,271 and sixty years before Twitter 
was founded.272 As discussed earlier, Marsh involved a company town with 
“all of the attributes of a state-created municipality” that exercised “semi-
official municipal functions as a delegate of the State,” and the U.S. 
 
 267. The state constitution is amended regularly, so it would be possible to amend it to 
reduce or eliminate its focus on traditional public forums. See Jennie Drage Bowser, 
Constitutions: Amend with Care, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Sept. 1, 2015),
www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/constitution-amend-with-care.aspx 
(“Citizens and lawmakers have been far more willing to make serious changes to state 
constitutions than to the federal one.”). 
 268. See State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1313 (citing 
? Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).  
 269. See id. at 1314. 
 270. Our Mission, FACEBOOK, https://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ (last visited 
Sept. 17, 2017) (noting that Facebook was founded in 2004). 
 271. Melzer, supra note 260. 
 272. Owen Williams, Twitter Has Lost More Than $2 Billion Since It Was Founded 
Twitter Milestones, NEXT WEB (Feb. 29, 2016), https://thenextweb.com/twitter/2016/
02/29/twitter-has-lost-more-than-2-billion-since-it-was-founded/ (noting that Twitter was 
founded in 2006). 
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Supreme Court ruled that Alabama violated the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments by forbidding a Jehovah’s Witness from distributing religious 
materials in the town. The opinion balanced the autonomy rights of property 
owners against the expressive rights of property users, recognizing that 
users occupy a “preferred position” in American jurisprudence.273 
In short, Marsh should be expanded and read functionally. It held that a 
company town and a public municipality were functional equivalents, such 
that the company town had to comply with First Amendment 
requirements.274 The Court held that the town’s property interests did not 
resolve the case, noting that “[t]he more an owner, for his advantage, opens 
up his property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights 
become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those 
who use it.”275 Such a rule is suitable for the digital world because it 
recognizes that private property can take on public characteristics, and 
unlike the reasoning of Hudgens and Morrison, both written in formalist 
terms reflecting the Civil Rights Cases, Marsh does not make ownership 
dispositive. Rather, ownership is one factor in a case–by–case balancing of 
rights. 
Further, Marsh is attractive because even though it permits comparisons 
of private and public spaces for state action purposes, unlike in Pruneyard, 
the comparisons are not tethered to traditional public forums. First, although 
the facts involved the distribution of literature on a sidewalk near a post 
office,276 the U.S. Supreme Court has held that such spaces are not 
traditional public forums.277 Second, although the case discusses generally 
the public character of spaces that are traditional public forums, it also 
discusses generally the public character of spaces that are not public forums, 
including turnpikes, ferries, and bridges.278 Third, whereas the opinion 
discusses the private discharge of public functions and the public character 
of private property, it does not limit these concepts to spaces that would be 
the functional equivalent of traditional public forums.279 
That said, it is necessary to broaden Marsh’s scope—beyond the context 
of company towns—to allow courts to compare public and private spaces 
on a case–by–case basis. In other words, rather than comparing the 
attributes of a particular private space to the attributes of a town, as Marsh 
 
 273. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946). ?  
 274. Id. at 507. ?  
 275. Id. at 506. ?  
 276. Id. at 503. ?  
 277. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 721 (1990). ?  
 278. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 506. 
 279. Id. at 506–07. 
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did, a state action theory based on an expanded Marsh would allow courts 
to compare public and private spaces more generally to assess whether a 
private space is functionally public. In the free expression context, several 
considerations would guide that assessment: (1) the nature of the private 
property interests at issue, and (2) whether the space is operated for general 
use by the public for expressive purposes, or whether the operation is itself 
a public function, either of which would favor a finding of state action. That 
approach is protective of property interests and responsive to the realities of 
today’s communications landscape—and it reflects the principle that the 
more a property owner opens up a space for public use, the more she must 
accommodate the rights of property users. It also accounts for values 
underlying the California and federal state action theories by considering 
private title (the federal emphasis) and public use (the California emphasis). 
Accounting for both puts the new approach between the formalism of 
Hudgens and the expansiveness of Pruneyard or Fashion Valley. Thus, it is 
not only functional, it is consistent with precedent recognizing the “need for 
careful balancing and . . . distinctions to ensure adequate protections for 
property rights.”280 
A functional Marsh–based state action theory for a digital world—
where advances in technology so quickly outpace the law, and where the 
lines between the public and private spheres are collapsing—enables the 
state action doctrine to adapt to changing realities. This theory also ensures 
the primacy of fundamental rights and their relevance to the great problems 
of the day. Its basic adaptability empowers judges to take into consideration 
the particular and fast–changing attributes of the private online spaces that 
serve, as noted earlier, as the primary means of public communication for 
many people. And it allows judges to characterize a space as public for state 
action purposes, even if the space would not qualify as a traditional public 
forum. For those reasons, the theory ensures that as the public becomes 
more private, and the private becomes more public, the state action 
doctrine’s contours will align with the contours of our fundamental rights.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Answering Professor Black’s call “to talk about [the state action 
doctrine] until we settle on a view both conceptually and functionally 
right,”281 this Article examined the First Amendment’s role in the private 
 
 280. See State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1314. ?  
 281. Black, supra note 1, at 70. 
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sector as “lawyers at Facebook and Google and Microsoft” exercise “more 
power over . . . free expression than any king or president or Supreme Court 
justice.”282 To that end, the Article analyzed the doctrine’s traditions and 
values, its historical distinction between the public and private spheres, and 
the law of public forums—ultimately concluding that the state action 
doctrine, under its latest reformulation by the U.S. Supreme Court, 
forecloses the First Amendment’s application to third–party platforms.  
However, the Article went on to suggest a state action theory suitable 
for the digital world that could be devised through further judicial revision 
of the doctrine or a constitutional amendment. It recognizes that the modern 
challenge of applying the doctrine lies where the private and public spheres 
meet—and that a state action theory that ignores speech in private digital 
spaces is problematic in light of our nation’s history of protecting speech in 
the spaces where it actually occurs.283 The new theory uses Marsh as a 
foundation because it can be both expanded and read functionally to enable 
judges to balance the rights of property owners with those of property users, 
accounting for the dynamism of online spaces. Thus, the theory ensures that 
as the public becomes more private, and the private becomes more public, 
the state action doctrine’s contours will remain aligned with those of our 
fundamental rights. And any uncertainty that might come from this more 
flexible and functional approach will surely, in time, resolve itself “as the 
common law system [begins] to adjudicate cases and the intrinsic limits of 
precedent [begin] to take hold.”284 
Professor Berman wrote in 2000 that “[d]ebates about the state action 
doctrine are arising again in the online context largely because we are facing 
the very real possibility that all of cyberspace will become an effectively 
private, Constitution-free zone.”285 That possibility has been realized to a 
great degree, and the state action doctrine continues to deserve our scholarly 
attention. Internet platforms, which increasingly have “a shared 
responsibility to help safeguard free expression,”286 are developing a de 
facto free speech jurisprudence that underscores the importance of adopting 
a state action theory suitable for a digital world “where public title and 
public use overlap with less frequency.”287 Indeed, it shows that such a 
theory should recognize the value of free speech as a means to personal and 
 
 282. Gross & Rosen, supra note 19. 
 283. See State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1313 (citing 
? Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)). 
 284. Berman, supra note 16, at 1308. 
 285. Id. at 1308. 
 286. Clinton, supra note 18. 
 287. State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1312. 
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democratic development and, correspondingly, the role of third–party 
platforms in providing access to that speech.  
 
